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      The framework of “Modern Theory of Critical State Transitions” (1, 2) considers the 
relation between different levels of organization in complex systems in terms of Critical 
State Transitions. A State Transition between levels entails changes of scale of 
observables and, concurrently, new formats of description at reduced dimensionality. It is 
here suggested that this principle can be applied to the hierarchic structure of the Nervous 
system, whereby the relations between different levels of its  functional organization  can 
be viewed as successions of State Transitions: upon State Transition,  the ‘lower’ level 
presents to the ‘higher’ level’ an abstraction of itself, at reduced dimensionality and at a 
coarser scale. The re-scaling in the State Transitions is associated with new objects of 
description, displays  new properties and obeys new laws, commensurate to the new 
scale. To illustrate this process, some aspects of the neural events thought to be 
associated with Cognition and Consciousness are discussed. However, the intent is here 
also more general in that State Transitions between all levels of organization are 
proposed as the mechanisms by which successively higher levels of organization 
“emerge” from lower levels. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The functional architecture of neural systems extends over a range of up to five orders of 
magnitude of scales in space and time: from microns and microseconds for ion channels at 
one end, to centimeters  and  tenth of seconds for interareal neuron clusters, at the other; and 
a 100 fold range of frequencies in the wave domain. In actual practice and on methodological 
grounds, this range is generally addressed at three levels of inquiry: microscopic (neuron 
spike activity), mesoscopic (local field potentials) and macroscopic (electroencephalogram, 
brain imaging) activity (3,4). Conceptually,  the functional relations between and within 
levels of organization are often considered in terms of integration and differentiation (5,6) or 
with a more specific functional connotation as  emergence versus  downward causation, 
respectively. Alternative conceptualizations are formulated in terms of the larger scale being 
‘slaved’ to the smaller by some coupling function or circular causality (7). The wide range of 
scales poses considerable conceptual and practical difficulties for designing large scale brain 
models, as does the scale-dependent change of degrees of freedom from level to level.  
Breakspaer and Stam (8) illustrate the latter relation in numerical models of between-scale 
bifurcations.  Brain modeling across multiple scales was also the subject of inquiry by 
Robinson et al (9).  Honey et al (10 ) explored issues of functional connectivity across 
multiple time scales. Horwitz and Glabus (11) addressed the complex issues raised by the  
multiple spatial-temporal scales of neuroscience data. Much as the importance of scale  
differences is appreciated,  I suggest  that its implications are not generally taken into 
account: that is the realization that the scale on each level of observation can emerge from the 
next finer level by ignoring some of the lower level details which become irrelevant at the 
higher level (12,13,14). In this sense, scales can ‘create’ classes of objects of observation, 
each class having its distinct description and obeys its own laws.  This point of view is being 
fruitfully applied for modeling spatiotemporal dynamics of systems in Ecology (15). In the 
following, I will associate scale transitions with concepts and principles of Critical State 
Transitions  in  ‘Modern Critical Theory’ (1,2). These principles are intended to be applicable 
to all inter- level relations, but I will illustrate their application here as a demonstration of 
concept for the relation between the neural events of  Cognition and Consciousness. As a 
paradigmatic inter-level relation,  it offers at this point relatively transparent criteria and 
benchmarks for applying the theory of Critical State Transitions, and what implications 
accrue from it.  
 
        The essay is organized in the following manner: a brief outline of the conceptual 
framework of the ‘Modern Critical Theory” precedes a sketch of neural events in Cognition 
and Consciousness, limited to those aspects that relevant for applying the notions of State 
Space. The final Section deals with the implications of viewing inter-level relations as State 
Space Transitions. This is intended to lend credence to the view that critical state transitions 
segregate reality into a hierarchy of domains, each characterized by its intrinsic scale, and 
associated structure and organizational laws. 
 
        The theoretical framework: Modern Theory of Critical State Transitions. 
The framework applied in this essay is rooted in some aspects of Contemporary Physics, 
specifically the field of Critical State Transitions, as viewed in “Modern Critical Theory” (1,2).  It is 
concerned with states of matter as organizational phenomena: elementary physical laws have in 
principle the ability to generate states and state transitions as organizational phenomena. (Be aware of 
terminological pitfalls: here and in the following , I use the term “states”  to designate what in some 
other sources are  also designated “phases”).  The class of state transitions under considerations in this 
essay are characterized by the abruptness of their occurrence at critical points of their system 
parameters. Typically, the operation of local microscopic laws results in the formation of aggregates 
by coarse graining. For an illustration of this process, see Ref. 17.  The collective state of matter is 
then unambiguously characterized by behavior that is exact in the large aggregate. The important 
feature  of the organization following state transition is the bringing into existence of new objects with 
distinct properties. Starting with familiar examples : think of the switch  from ferro- to paramagnetism, 
or the transition from water to ice. Typically, one deals with a large collection of ‘microscopic’ 
constituents  which  at state transition to a ‘macrostate’  display  qualitatively novel features and 
properties. The macrostate’s  novel properties have no referent at the microscopic  level and require 
new descriptors: think of hardness or liquidity in the ice-water example as descriptors of new physical 
referents. Accordingly, state transitions create new physical states which call for new descriptions of 
physical reality (16). In addition, “Modern Critical Theory” considers  reality as a hierarchy of  levels, 
each level having its own scale, its own description, and a theory that accounts for the scale of that 
description. The scale on each level emerges from the scale on the next finer level by ignoring some of 
the lower-level details which become invisible at the scale of the higher level (13,14): loosely 
speaking, view the macrostate as an abstract rendition of the microstate which recedes to  invisibility 
in the new scale, comparable to changing to glasses with lower magnification.   
    Most of the successful applications of this framework come from Thermodynamics and Statistical 
Mechanics at or near critical state transitions of physical matter. As an empirical fact, certain 
parameters of material systems assume at the point of state  transition critical values which define 
entire classes of system (Universality Classes), presenting identical macrostates despite a wide range 
of differences at the level of microscopic constituents (in terms of composition, physical properties 
etc). A corollary of this is the multiple realizability of emergent new macroscopic phenomena despite 
microscopic diversity (for details, see: Ref. 18).  This principle can be illustrated with a metaphor 
taken from Probability Theory: when sets of multiple independent population samples are subsumed 
under some statistical (say Gaussian) Distribution, then the parameters of the distribution characterize 
a (kind of)  Universality Class , i.e. the ensemble of which the individual sets of samples are 
independent realizations. 
    Universality and multiple realization designate that 1) some details of the system which would 
figure in a detailed causal-mechanistic explanation of the system’s behavior, are in the limit to some 
extent irrelevant for characterizing the macroscopic phenomenology of interest; and 2) different 
systems with vastly different “micro” details can exhibit identical behavior at the macroscopic level. 
The result in both cases is a drastic reduction of the dimensionality in the state transition.  State space 
transitions in physical matter can be simulated in many different kinds of computational models which 
permit examining the underlying events in detail.  Procedures of “coarse graining” (19) and the 
strategies of Renormalization Group Theory (20) are the principle tools; the latter essentially, re-
scaling by successive coarse graining while maintaining self-similarity. 
 
On the neural events in Cognition and Consciousness: setting the stage for a 
demonstration of Concept.  
    Here I merely sketch in broad outline the neurophysiological events that form the benchmarks for 
illustrating the application of Critical State Transitions. Implicit is the Dynamical System approach in 
Neurodynamics (for a recent discussions, see Refs. 21, 22).  Abundant evidence for the brain’s 
propensity to undergo State Transitions was secured by Freeman and Holmes (23), and by Freeman in 
numerous studied, see for instance Refs. 24, 25,26,  extending also into considerations of quantum 
field theory (27).  Jirsa et al (7, 28) studied abrupt transitions between sensorimotor coordination 
patterns in a general framework of multistability  and switching in biological systems, applying the 
conceptual tools of Synergetics  (29). Convincing evidence for brain state  transitions is also 
summarized  in publications by Bressler and Kelso (30) and Chialvo (31), and demonstrated  by 
Gervasoni et al (32). At the mesoscopic level,  Fujisawa et al ( 33 ) demonstrated that internal states of 
neurons (expressed in UP-DOWN alternation) can be subject to state transitions of their embedding  
recurrent neuronal networks. 
  The neural processes of the reactive behavior of organism’s sensory-motor interaction with the 
environment are for this demonstration of concept taken at the microscopic level those constituting the 
neural events thought to be associated with consciousness as the macroscopic level. I adopt Searle’s 
(34) notion of the state of wakefulness as basal (background) consciousness, a kind of unified field, 
presumably  identical or overlapping with the condition of vigilance in the terminology of Dehaene & 
Changeux (35). Specific sensory events would then punctuate, as it were, the steady state of the 
unified field, as the basis of  discrete subjective experiences.  This notion of discrete events in 
Consciousness tallies with observations of Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts (36) of discontinuities in the 
EEG  which they identify as transient operational brain microstates, signaling shifting activation of  
neuronal networks; and of Lehmann and associates (37) who describe punctuated abrupt changes in 
EEG activity as evidence of distinct steps in mental information processing.  
     Comparing neural models with perceptual phenomena, Dehaene and Changeux (38) emphasize 
the suddenness of the transition to conscious and reportable registration of stimulus events, associated 
in the neural model with a “self-amplifying recurrent activity” in widely-distributed cortical regions.   
Edelman (39) considers dynamic reentrant interactions across cortical circuits as the medium for 
synchronous linking and binding among widely distributed brain areas. Sergent & Dehaene (40) and 
Del Cul et al. (41) take their findings with the attentional blink test and backward masking, 
respectively, to be concordant with the notion of a discrete threshold for access to consciousness. 
Abruptness of onset of conscious experience is also an essential aspect of the extended psychophysical 
studies of Breitmeyer and Ogman (42).  Damasio (43) postulated synchronous activation of globally 
distributed convergence zones to serve as the neural substrate of recall and recognition, and 
subsequently. However, what appears to be also required for conscious experience  is that the 
somatically embodied and environmentally reactive behavior be associated with the body’s moment-
to-moment adaptive bioregulatory processes, originating with a multiplicity of subcortical brain 
structures (44,45). In its totality, existing evidence supports the basic idea of Baars ‘ Global 
Workspace Theory’ of associating consciousness with widespread access among otherwise 
independent brain functions (46,47). A particular view is advocated  by a group of investigators who 
attribute the distinction between unconscious and conscious vision  to recurrent processing: Lamme 
and associates (48,49) claim that reportable conscious visual experiences  require that the 
“feedforward sweep” of neural activation from visual towards motor areas become extended  to a 
“backward sweep” which consists of  widespread recurrent activation of frontal, prefrontal and 
temporal cortex (50,51). 
    The foregoing sketch of observations and conjectures is intended to underscore the signal 
feature of neural events in Cognition and Consciousness that warrant considering a Critical State 
Transition: abruptness of change in large-scale patterns of connectivity of otherwise disparate brain 
regions. In what way the neural state transition may be associated with the emergence of mental states 
is outside the scope of this essay. 
    Taking State Space seriously 
  The context of the observations of the foregoing section and the totality of findings with Brain 
Imaging and Electroencephalography supports viewing the brain as a dynamical system of 
unprecedented complexity. This suggests adopting the State Space approach for characterizing the 
brain’s states as points (or circumscribed regions) in a high dimensional space. The dimensionality of 
the state space reflects the number of the system’s independent variables which can also be considered 
components of a state vector. A system’s State Space encompasses the set of all potentially accessible 
states of the system: Dynamical system theory is concerned with the progression in time of state 
vectors in state space, describing a trajectory of the system’s evolution with the potential for 
bifurcation. Citing a few  investigators who have adopted this route :Wackermann’s (52) assessment of 
electroencephalographic field changes as State Space trajectories,  Hobson’s (53) view of different 
stages of wakefulness and sleep in terms of state space dynamics; the demonstration of global brain 
state transitions occurring simultaneously across multiple forebrain areas (32); and  a mapping 
between brain states and phenomenal experience (54).  Application of state space concepts in the form 
of Coordination Dynamics has significantly enriched the understanding of the relations between global 
brain dynamics and behavior (30).  
 The Introduction and Section 2 referred  to changes of scale as source of a new physical reality, 
requiring new descriptors (55,56).  How does this new physical reality come into being, and what does 
it entail ?  At the critical point of state transition, the micro state undergoes a profound reconfiguration 
which, among other features, is expressed as change of the correlation among its elements. The 
correlation function   characterizes how the value at one point in state space is correlated with the 
value at another point, reflecting the micro level’s fine structure. While under stable conditions 
extending over short distances, correlation length progressively increases as the critical point of state 
transition is approached.  At the critical point itself, correlation length diverges to the extent that only 
correlations extending over larger scales remain. This implies that the system, metaphorically 
speaking, looses a detailed ‘memory’ of its microscopic structure.  Thus, the macroscopic  
manifestation is at the critical point essentially based on a kind of  abstraction from the original  micro 
level, with all but those micro level features preserved that now determine the novel macroscopic 
observables at a new scale. This is also the point of drastic reduction of microscopic degrees of 
freedom.  The change in correlations among the microscopic features at state transition can also be 
viewed as change to a coarser state space topology with new neighborhood relations among features, 
and thus associated with novel physical manifestations. Concurrently, the microscopic structure looses 
any characteristic length scale for system specific variables: it becomes scale invariant, i.e. fractal . 
Recent observations of Chialvo et al (57) point to the relevance of these considerations for brain 
processes: applying the technique of Fox et al (58) voxel based correlations  of BOLD activity of 
different brain regions were obtained in fMRI studies of humans (59). These correlation maps were 
similar to those obtained computationally with Ising models in critical state transitions displaying 
long-range spin correlations. This observations support the notion that long range correlations among 
neural groups do obtain in the brain, as sign of it being in critical state.   
  Thinking in terms of State Space directs attention to the elaborate theoretical framework of state 
transitions. For a principled approach, it is here proposed that the Physics of Critical State Transitions 
(55,56) offers useful guidelines for relating macroscopic to microscopic system properties. In this 
framework, the previously noted abruptness of large-scale changes of the neural state space 
configurations would reflect a state transition to a new level of organization. Note the fundamental 
tenet of Critical Theory, in distinction from flow of trajectories in state space: Critical Theory is 
concerned with the origin of genuinely novel organizational patterns, triggered when system 
parameters attain critical values. This framework constitutes an alternative to conventional views of 
“information flow” along neural pathways and relay stations (60). Instead, transitions between levels 
of organization would be punctuated by abrupt transitions, such that consecutive levels of organization 
emerge as coarse grained abstractions of another level; each level being a distinct collective state of 
matter expressed in terms of its own organization on its own intrinsic scale. Rules governing the 
behavior of one level are no longer valid at the next level. 
  Generalizing beyond Neuroscience: in the view of Critical Theory, reality is composed of a 
hierarchy of levels and scales:  at the state transitions, an intrinsically new scale emerges at each level, 
differing from that of the next finer level by ignoring some of the (irrelevant) details of the latter (13, 
14). In this approach, the so called higher level description is not an evolution, nor an approximation 
of the fundamental (lower) level state, but represents a qualitatively new pattern of reality (61).   
  The emphasis in this essay on illustrating the essential features of the conceptual approach of the 
Theory of Critical State Transitions to neural systems should not obscure the generality of its 
relevance to  pattern formation in nonequilibrium dynamic systems:  merely to sketch here the scope 
of applicability, I refer to  issues in morphogenesis (62 , 63 ) transition dynamics of biological systems 
on mesoscopic scale (e.g.: 64 ), and case studies of human social  systems (e.g.: 65 ). For a more 
comprehensive collection of relevant topics, see Ref. 66 . 
    Some final Questions : what can Modern Critical Theory contribute to Neuroscience ? 
   The foregoing  discussion  contends that the abrupt  reconfiguration of neural state space may be 
the manifestations of global brain state transitions: that is, a qualitatively novel expression of 
functional organization at a new scale of reduced dimensionality. In this view, the process of state 
transition of the brain’s complex dynamical system enlists the conceptual  and interpretive repertoire 
of the theory of Critical State Transitions, in analogy to the Physics of Condensed Matter. Thinking in 
this framework raises numerous questions, the answers to which are beyond one’s intuitive grasp, but 
are amenable to computational simulation: What are  the “tipping points” (67) for neural state space 
transitions ?  What is the space of potential reconfigurations that such systems can in principle 
undergo under perturbation ?  Under what conditions do they sustain stability ?  
      Bear in mind that the main thrust of this essay is the notion of emergence of new patterns of 
reality, due to changes in scales. The evolution of complex dynamic systems that cannot be deduced  
from their microscopic configurations, but can, at best, be approximated by equivalence classes of 
microscopic models. It is then a pragmatic issue to select from among candidate models those with 
best predictive value for macrosystem performance, and in closest accord with features and constraints 
imposed by the system’s known micro- and mesoscopic organization. This approach also raises a 
question about universality classes: Can it be shown that neural systems belong to a universality class, 
or are unique and in a class by themselves ?  If so, on account of what property ?  And conversely: do 
there exist micro level states of other matter which, on state transition, constitute a neural system like 
universality class ? 
      To come to appreciate the space of possibilities in brain dynamics, these kinds of questions 
warrant exploring in their own right with computational models applying methods of statistical 
mechanics . Points of departure are suggested by patterns of collective neuronal activity in cultured 
brain slices, attributed  by Beggs and Plenz (68,69) and  Haldeman and Beggs (70) to a critical 
branching process,  and by Breskin et al. (71) to Percolation transitions.  Beggs and Thiagarajan (72) 
discussed several theoretical models to account for the fractal structure of neuronal avalanches as 
manifestations of cell assemblies, with the characteristics property of being scale free. Additional  
reference points are: packages of neural spike (“synfire chains”) exhibit critical behavior, 
corresponding percolation state transitions (73);  ion channel dynamics has the signature of a 
percolating network (74). Kozma et al (75) applied  Percolation models to explore the dynamics of 
neuropil. As a program of research, the framework adumbrated in this essay and by these observations 
would situate brains squarely into the domain of the Physics of Condensed Matter. 
 The State Space framework of the relation between finer- and coarser levels implies inevitably 
an intersection of Complexity Science with the perennial philosophical problem of Emergence (76). 
Kim (77) identified five main tenets of  “the doctrine of Emergentism”, singling out as defining 
features the coming-together of lower-level entities in new structural configurations; the origin of 
“higher level” properties, their unpredictability and irreducibility and, finally, the causal efficacy of 
emergent properties of their own. In light of the foregoing discussion of  the distinction between a 
finer and a coarser level, it appears that the decisive event at Critical State Transitions  is the origin of 
a new scale  and, consequently, the point at which new objects, properties and laws originate, 
commensurate to that new scale. Taking the view of reality as a hierarchy of scales as basis, objects 
and properties in reality appear at each level in the hierarchy with their own organizational laws and 
structure, and with the propensity to undergo sharp state transitions (13). States  are cases of 
emergence, based on Nature having walls of scales.  Changes in scales, in turn, define new Ontologies 
for new descriptions.   
    The recent comprehensive overview  by Deco et al (78 ) affords the opportunity for bringing in 
sharper focus the differences in approach and outlook presented by these authors, and the view 
presented in this essay. In the former, two approaches are considered in the summary of numerical 
simulations:  applying a multiscale hierarchy with self-consistent evolution equations at each scale for 
coupling the emergent dynamics from fine to coarser scales; or, alternatively, to recursively enslave 
micro- and mesoscale dynamics for generating macroscopic  field oscillations driven  by mean field 
synaptic currents. In the present speculative essay, the emphasis is radically different: here, the relation 
between levels of functional organization  are punctuated and discontinuous,  metaphorically 
comparable to a “bucket brigade”, with each “bucket”  processing its “content” to the point of a state 
transition ; thus, passing the result of its intrinsic processing at coarse-grained reduced dimensionality 
to a recipient level. Accordingly, what is being passed from level to level are the descriptions of 
objects generated at scales , intrinsic to each bucket.  Whether the latter view, with its conceptual 
inheritance from Condensed Matter Physics, is by itself or possibly in combination with other dynamic 
approaches of any merit, is a matter of future inquiry.  
    
Summary. 
 
The conceptual principles of Critical State Transitions are discussed, with the relation 
between neural events thought to constitute Cognition and Consciousness serving as an 
illustrative case study. The focus is on the origin of new scales in state transitions, and their 
role for defining emergent levels of Ontologies and descriptions with reduced dimensionality. 
The intent is to give credence to the notion that the approach here illustrated for the neural 
events in Cognition and Consciousness can provide valuable insights for relations among all  
levels of the nervous system’s functional architecture. 
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